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Abstract—This paper develops a systematic framework for
analyzing how low frequency forced oscillations propagate in
electric power systems. Using this framework, the paper shows
how to mathematically justify the so-called Dissipating Energy
Flow (DEF) forced oscillation source-location technique, and the
DEF’s specific deficiencies are pinpointed. Leveraging incremen-
tal passivity enforcement, a set of simple inference problems
are introduced whose solutions can be used in conjunction with
the proposed propagation framework in order to enhance the
effectiveness of the DEF method. The proposed techniques are
illustrated on the IEEE 39-bus New England test system.
Index Terms—Forced oscillations, inverse problems, passivity,
phasor measurement unit (PMU), power system dynamics.
I. INTRODUCTION
FORCED oscillations (FOs) are still a problematic realityin modern electric power systems. Caused by extraneous
periodic perturbations, FOs can compromise system security,
degrade system performance, and resonantly excite poorly
damped interarea modes [1]–[3]. Despite widescale deploy-
ment of Phasor Measurement Units (PMUs) across the US
high voltage transmission network, locating the sources of
these FOs remains a challenging task due to their sporadic
nature, speed of propagation, and inability to be predicted
by the system operators’ dynamical models. Since the most
effective way for dealing with a FO is to locate the source
and disconnect it from service [4], an effective source-location
technique is an indespensible smart grid application.
Of the many source-location techniques currently available
in the academic marketplace [5], the so-called Dissipating
Energy Flow (DEF) method has enjoyed some of the most
successful testing results, both in simulation environments [4]
and in real-time applications [6]. The method was originally
developed by Chen et al. [7], but its underlying mathematics
leverage the Lyapunov functions from [8]. Despite its suc-
cess, when its underlying modeling assumptions are violated,
the method may perform poorly [9]–[11]. Additionally, the
method has lacked a generalized framework which is capable
of providing a system-wide justification for its usage.
Despite its inadequacies, the DEF’s excellent performance
in real-time application at ISO New England strongly implies
that further research should be performed in order to more sys-
tematically characterize the method. Shortcomings of the DEF
method have been analyzed in [9], and [11] has recommended
using passivity theory to interpret the method from a new
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mathematical perspective, but no recommendations have been
made in terms of how to enhance the method’s performance
(aside from practical implementation suggestions in [4]).
To make such recommendations, a systematic framework is
needed in order to thoroughly study the DEF. Accordingly,
the primary contributions of this paper are as follows:
1) Using the Frequency Response Function (FRF) analysis
proposed in [10], we leverage a variety of tools from AC
circuit theory in order to develop a linearized framework
for analyzing oscillation propagation at the system level.
2) We subsequently use the proposed framework, along
with the passivity observations from [11], to theoretically
justify the DEF method, predict when it will fail, and
show that there exists no other quadratic passivity trans-
formation which will render all components of the entire
network passive in a classical power system.
3) A set of inference problems, some with DEF-based
passivity constraints, is used to construct the proposed
propagation model. Using this model, a simple optimiza-
tion problem is solved to locate the source of a FO.
II. PERTURBATIVE NETWORK MODEL DERIVATION
In this section, we introduce a linearized network model
which is particularly useful for analyzing FO propagation in
power systems. We refer to it as a “perturbative” model since
it captures the network’s response to small perturbations.
A. Complex Admittance Matrices
We consider a power system component, shown in Fig. 1,
whose dynamics are governed according to the DAE set
x˙ = f(x,u,uv) (1a)
y = g(x,u,uv), (1b)
where inputs uv = [Vr, Vi] and outputs y = [Ir, Ii] are vec-
tors of real and imaginary voltages and currents, respectively.
Fig. 1. DAE modeled component tied to a larger power system.
We linearize this model around a steady state operating
point to linearly relate the voltage and current perturbations:
∆x˙ = A∆x+B∆uv (2a)
∆y = C∆x+D∆uv. (2b)
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2Assuming (2) is BIBO stable, its Fourier transform admits the
Frequency Response Function (FRF) of the component [10]:
y˜ =
(
C(jΩ1−A)−1B +D)︸ ︷︷ ︸
Y(jΩ)
u˜v, (3)
where Ω is the angular frequency of the input and output
signals, and Y ≡ Y(jΩ)∈C2×2 is referred to as the admittance
matrix relating voltage u˜v ∈ C2×1 and current y˜ ∈ C2×1
perturbations. These perturbations can be given in rectangular
(V˜r, V˜i) or polar (V˜, θ˜) coordinates depending on convenience.
In this paper, we will primarily consider the effects of the FRF
matrix at the relevant forcing frequency Ωd of the FO.
B. Network Modeling
Consider a power system network whose graph G(V, E) has
edge set E , |E| = m, vertex set V , |V| = n, and directed
nodal incidence matrix E ∈ Rm×n. We build an augmented
incidence matrix Ea ∈ R2m×2n. This matrix is constructed by
taking E and replacing all values of 1 with the 2× 2 identity
matrix 12 and all values of 0 with a 2× 2 zero matrix 0:
E =
 1 −1 · · ·0 1
...
. . .
 ⇔ Ea =
 12 −12 · · ·0 12... . . .
 . (4)
Considering voltage and current perturbation phasors such
as u˜v and y˜ from (3), we define the vector Vb ∈
C2n×1 as the vector of rectangular bus voltage perturba-
tion phasors, and we define the vector Il ∈ C2m×1 as
the vector of rectangular line current perturbation phasors,
where the convention of the positive line current flows
agrees with the direction of the augmented incidence matrix:
Vb =

V˜r,1
V˜i,1
...
V˜r,n
V˜i,n
 , (5) Il =

I˜r,1
I˜i,1
...
I˜r,m
I˜i,m
 . (6)
Admittance matrices Yl,1, ...,Yl,m, Yl,i ∈ R2×2, associated
with the m transmission lines, are placed diagonally in the
matrix YL ∈ R2m×2m such that
YL =
 Yl,1 0. . .
0 Yl,m
 . (7)
Line current and bus voltage perturbations obey Ohm’s law:
YLEaVb = Il. (8)
Admittance matrices Ys,1, ...,Ys,n, Ys,i ∈ C2×2, associated
with shunt elements at each of the n buses, are placed
diagonally in the matrix YS ∈ C2n×2n, such that
YS =
 Ys,1 0. . .
0 Ys,n
 . (9)
These shunt admittances are not simply capacitors or in-
ductors; they can represent generators, loads, or any other
terminal element in the system and can be constructed via
(3). If multiple elements are connected in parallel, such as
a generator and its station load, their admittances can be
modeled independently and summed to compute the aggregate
shunt admittance. The shunt matrix YS may be used to
compute the shunt current injections1 Is∈C2n×1 via
Is = YSVb. (10)
As outlined in [10], when analyzing a network with this
representation, FOs show up like current sources at their
respective source buses. For a system experiencing a single
FO, there will be a single current source driving the entire
network. We define sparse FO vector of current injections
J ∈ C2n×1. If bus k contains the sole source of a FO, then
Ji = 0, ∀i /∈ {2k − 1, 2k} . (11)
Source injections in J obey the same current convention as
Is. The network obeys KCL, i.e., all nodal currents sum to 0:
J+ Is + E
†
aIl = 0. (12)
We define II ≡ E†aIl to be the aggregate current injection at
each node: it represents the sum of the source current injection
at each bus plus the shunt current flowing to ground. Via
conservation of current at each bus, we have
−J = II + Is (13a)
= E†aIl + YSVb (13b)
=
(
E†aYLEa + YS
)
Vb. (13c)
The block-Hermitian dynamic nodal admittance (or augmented
dynamic Y-bus) matrix YB ∈ C2n×2n is this defined to be
YB = E†aYLEa + YS . (14)
Assuming there is a single FO in the system, it is instructive
to rewrite (13c) with partitioned matrices and vectors, where
the system has been renumbered such that the source bus is
bus 1, and the current injection has a value of I ∈ C2×1:
−J = YBVb (15a)[ −I
0
]
=
[ YB1 YB2
YB3 YB4
] [
Vs
Vns
]
, (15b)
where Vs∈C2×1 represents voltage perturbations at the source
bus, Vns ∈ C(2n−2)×1 represents voltage perturbations at all
other buses, and Vb = V_s Vns. While I represents the true
source current injection, we may also define I ′ as the sum of
the source current at the source bus plus its shunt injection:
I ′ = I + Ys,1Vs. (16)
Correspondingly, we say that Y ′B1 contains no shunt element,
and I ′ is the current directly measured at the source bus
flowing into the network; we note that it is equal to the first two
elements of II . We now restate (15a)-(15b) with this update:
−J′ = Y ′BVb (17a)[ −I ′
0
]
=
[ Y ′B1 YB2
YB3 YB4
] [
Vs
Vns
]
. (17b)
1Shunt currents flowing out of the circuit to ground are defined as positive.
3A simple Kron reduction can be performed in order to deter-
mine the effective admittance “seen” by the current source:
−I ′ = (Y ′B1 − YB2Y−1B4YB3)︸ ︷︷ ︸
YN
Vs, (18)
where YN ∈ C2×2 is a 2 × 2 complex aggregate network
admittance matrix and Vs is the resulting voltage caused by
the current injection I ′ interacting with the aggregate network
dynamics codified in YN . In this model, since voltage pertur-
bations are considered a response to rouge current injections, it
is helpful to rewrite (18) with voltage as a function of current:
Vs = −ZNI ′, (19)
where ZN = Y−1N is the aggregate network impedance. In
other words, the current injection I ′ gives rise to the network
voltages, and the vector Vb in (17a) is not arbitrary: the Kron
reduction of (18) is only meaningful when Vb acts as a solu-
tion to the linear system −J′ = Y ′BVb, i.e. Vb = −(Y ′B)−1J′.
Definition 1. We refer to the admittance matrix YN of (18)
as the system’s dynamic Ward equivalent (DWE) admittance.
C. Quadratic Energy Considerations
As with any network which obeys Kirchhoff’s laws, Tel-
legen’s theorem is also obeyed: the sum of the products of
branch (including shunt branches) potential differences and
branch flows is equal to 0. Accordingly,
0 = (EaVb)
†
Il +V
†
b (Is + J) (20a)
= V†b
(
E†aIl + Is + J
)
(20b)
= V†b (YB − YB)Vb, (20c)
where (20a) is the statement of Tellegen’s theorem, (20b) is the
conservation of current, and (20c) is the resulting proof. As a
consequence of this theorem, there exist a family of quadratic
functionals for which conservation laws can be formulated. An
obvious one is the “real power”, Re{VI†}, that is consumed
only on the elements with positive resistance. In the context
of FOs, an alternative interpretation of the conservation of
power can be acquired by manipulating (17b) in order to
define another (arbitrary) type of quadratic power2. The key
observation is that this new quadratic power will be conserved
throughout the network. To show why, we consider matrix
Q ∈ C2n×2n with block diagonal sub-matrices Qb ∈ C2×2:
Q =
 Qb 0. . .
0 Qb
 . (21)
We now left multiply (17a) by V†bQ, which represents the
application of a quadratic energy function:
−V†bQJ′ = V†bQY ′BVb (22a)
−V†sQbI ′ = V†b
(QE†aYLEa)Vb +V†b (QY ′S)Vb. (22b)
2The term “quadratic power” is used since we are multiplying voltages and
currents, but the quadratic quantity doesn’t necessarily have the interpretation
of physical power. It can also be interpreted as an “energy function”. Quadratic
energy and quadratic power are therefore used interchangeably.
Different choices for matrix Qb correspond to different energy
function applications, but in each case, the quadratic quantity
is conserved. For example, if Qb is chosen such that
Qb =
[
0 − 1jΩ
1
jΩ 0
]
, (23)
then the associated energy function corresponds to the DEF
method [11]. Under DEF assumptions, lines and loads are
rendered lossless, i.e (QbY) + (QbY)† = 0. Thus, in taking
the real part, (22b) simplifies to
Re{V†sQbI ′}︸ ︷︷ ︸
Source Energy
+
n∑
i=2
Re{V†ns,i (QbYs,i)Vns,i}︸ ︷︷ ︸
Generator Damping Contributions
= 0. (24)
where Vs and Vns,i are the source and ith non-source bus
voltage perturbation vectors, respectively. The formulation of
(24) further clarifies the DEF’s functionality: since all the
damping energy consumed by generators is positive [11], the
source energy is necessarily negative and can be traced back
to the single, negative source. The DEF technique, therefore,
is based on tracking a particular type of quadratic power in
the network. When constructing the system’s quadratic energy
function, we are not restricted to choosing just a Q matrix.
We may also introduce matrix P whose structure matches Q.
For example, we may set Ub = P−1Vb, left multiply (17a)
by U†bQ, and insert a PP−1 term. Updating (24) yields:
Re{U†sQbI ′}︸ ︷︷ ︸
Source Energy
+
n∑
i=2
Re{U†ns,i (QbYs,iPb)Uns,i}︸ ︷︷ ︸
Generator Damping Contributions
= 0. (25)
III. ENERGY FUNCTION ANALYSIS
The DEF method can be interpreted as the application of a
specific quadratic energy function to all elements of a network.
Reference [11], which reviews relevant passivity concepts,
explains how this quadratic energy function can be interpreted
as a matrix transformation (called a “passivity transformation”)
which attempts to render system elements incrementally pas-
sive. Generally, a passive component is one which can only
dissipate and store, but not produce, physical power. To avoid
confusion, we point out that this paper discusses the so-called
incremental passivity, which refers to the passive nature of a
system’s incremental change from its equilibrium. This is also
known as “shifted passivity”. We stress that physical passivity
of an element does not imply incremental passivity of the
transformed system. In the remainder of the paper, the term
passivity always refers to incremental passivity.
Reference [11] shows that the DEF energy function is
inadequate for lossy network elements. While it may be
tempting to develop a new passivity transformation which is
suitable for lossy networks, in this section, we use passivity
theory to prove that no constant quadratic energy function
exists for the classical model of a multimachine power system.
A. Basis Matrices
To aide in the energy function analysis and inference
techniques, we define a useful set of basis matrices.
4Definition 2. We define orthogonal (A−1 =A†) basis matrices
T 1 =
[
1 0
0 1
]
, T 2 =
[
1 0
0 −1
]
,
T 3 =
[
0 1
1 0
]
, T 4 =
[
0 −1
1 0
]
,
and the set T = {T 1, T 2, T 3, T 4}. Set T spans region R2×2.
Lemma 1. There exists no non-singular matrix Γ ∈ C2×2 for
which, simultaneously,
Re
{
v†
(
T iΓ
)
v
} ≥ 0, ∀v ∈ C2×1, ∀i ∈ {1} (26)
Re
{
v†
(
T iΓ
)
v
}
= 0, ∀v ∈ C2×1, ∀i ∈ {2, 3, 4}. (27)
Proof. We write Γ as the sum of its diagonal (Γd) and off-
diagonal (Γo) component matrices: Γ = Γd + Γo. Since
Re{v†(T iΓ)v} = 0, ∀v ∈ C2×2 is equivalent to stating that
T iΓ + (T iΓ)
† = 0, the constraints on Γ caused by T 2, T 3,
and T 4 from (27) may be stated as
T 2 → Γd = −Γ†d, Γo = Γ†o, (28)
T 3 → KΓd = −Γ†dK, KΓo = −Γ†oK, (29)
T 4 → KΓd = Γ†dK, KΓo = −Γ†oK, (30)
where K ≡ T 3 is defined to be the reversal matrix in [12]. Ac-
cordingly, Γd must be simultaneously skew-Hermitian, skew-
perhermitian and perhermitian, respectively [12]. Necessarily,
Γd = 0. The matrix Γo must be simultaneously Hermitian
and skew-perhermitian. Necessarily, jβT 4, β∈ R1, is the only
matrix which fits this description. We define
Γ? = jβT 4 (31)
as the only matrix which uniformly satisfies (27). We apply
Γ = Γ? to (26) and consider the eigenvalues of the matrix
T 1Γ
? +
(
T 1Γ
?
)†
= 2βjT 4:
det
[
2βjT 4 − diag{λ}
]
= λ2 − 4β2, (32)
λ = ±2β (33)
which violates (26). Since T 1Γ?+ (T 1Γ?)† is an indefinite
matrix but Γ? is the only matrix which satisfies (27), the
theorem has been proved.
Corollary 1. Γ? is a solution to PΓ? + (PΓ?)† = 0 for any
matrix P which may be written as P =
∑4
i=2 αiT i, αi∈R1.
Corollary 2. The results of Lemma 1 stand if T i is right multi-
plied by transformation matrix M instead of left multiplied by
transformation matrix Γ. There exists no non-singular matrix
M ∈ C2×2 for which the following simultaneously hold:
Re
{
v†
(
MT i
)
v
} ≥ 0, ∀v ∈ C2×2, ∀i ∈ {1} (34)
Re
{
v†
(
MT i
)
v
}
= 0, ∀v ∈ C2×2, ∀i ∈ {2, 3, 4} (35)
Corollary 3. By employing both non-singular matrices Γ ∈
C2×2 and M ∈ C2×2, the solution to
Re
{
v†
(
MT iΓ
)
v
}
= 0, ∀v ∈ C2×1, ∀i ∈ {2, 3, 4} (36)
must take the form Γ = (jβT 4)M† for any M ∈ C2×2. This
may be seen via the following manipulation:
0 = MT iΓ + (MT iΓ)
†, ∀i ∈ {2, 3, 4} (37a)
= T i(ΓM
†−1) + (M−1Γ†)T
†
i , ∀i ∈ {2, 3, 4} (37b)
Since (37b) may only be solved by ΓM†
−1
= jβT 4, per
Lemma 1, we have that Γ = (jβT 4)M† must be satisfied.
B. Quadratic Energy Functions in a Classical Power System
We now assume the classical model of a lossy multimachine
power system model [13] and allow for constant power loads
to be present. The forms of the FRFs associated with constant
power loads (Yp), constant impedance lines/shunts (Yz), and
classical generators (Yg) are given in [11]. The set of plausible
FRFs associated with these three elements may be constructed
according to the following basis matrix combinations:
Yp =
∑
i=2, 3
aiT i, ai∈R1 (38a)
Yz =
∑
i=1, 4
aiT i, ai∈R1 (38b)
Yg =
∑
i=2, 3, 4
(ai + jbi)T i, ai, bi∈R1. (38c)
The FRF of a classical generator is derived and fully explained
in [10], and, for convenience, is explicitly re-stated here:
Yg =γ(Ω)
[
sin(δ) cos(δ) − cos2(δ)
sin2(δ) − sin(δ) cos(δ)
]
︸ ︷︷ ︸
Tδ
+
[
0 1X′d−1
X′d
0
]
︸ ︷︷ ︸
TX
(39)
γ(Ω) =
E′2
X ′2d
(
M (jΩ)
2
+ VtE
′
X′d
cos(ϕ)
)
− j (ΩD)(
VtE′
X′d
cos(ϕ)−MΩ2
)2
+ (ΩD)
2
. (40)
where δ is the generator’s absolute rotor angle and γ ≡ γ(Ω)∈
C1 is a complex frequency dependent parameter. Given that
any FRF matrix Y may be written as the complex sum of the
four basis matrices, we have the following useful definition:
Definition 3. We assume Y = ∑4i=1 (ai + jbi)T i. Using
matrices M and Γ from Corollary 3, where Γ = (jβT 4)M†,
we define P ? = Re{u† (MYΓ)u} as the dissipating power
for input vector u. We further define two other types of
quadratic power: resistive power P ?r and damping power P ?d ,
where P ? = P ?r + P
?
d , and
• P ?r = Re
{
u†
(
M
(
a1T 1
)
Γ
)
u
}
• P ?d = Re
{
u†
(
M
(
jb2T 2 + jb3T 3 + jb4T 4
)
Γ
)
u
}
.
We now prove that a perturbative system model containing
elements (38a)-(38c) cannot be rendered passive under any
quadratic passivity transformation. In other words, there is no
quadratic quantity that is dissipated by all elements present in
common networks.
Theorem 1. There exist no non-singular matrices M ∈ C2×2
and Γ ∈ C2×2 for which
MYΓ + (MYΓ)†  0, ∀Y ∈ {Yp, Yz, Yg} . (41)
Proof. The FRF of a strictly reactive element, such as matrix
TX in (39), is ∝ T 4 while the FRF of a strictly capacitive
element is ∝ −T 4. The only way for MT 4Γ+
(
MT 4Γ
)†  0
and −MT 4Γ −
(
MT 4Γ
)†  0 to be simultaneously true
is for MT 4Γ +
(
MT 4Γ
)† ≡ 0. Since both reactive and
5capacitive elements appear in classical power systems, T 4
must be lossless under the desired passivity transformation.
We now consider some classical generator whose damping
characteristics are sufficiently small (D ≈ 0), such that γ is
a real parameter. In this case, the matrix MYgΓ + (MYgΓ)†
reduces to MγTδΓ + (MγTδΓ)
† since TX must be a lossless
element according to the previous conclusion about T 4.
We define the squared electromechanical resonant frequency
associated with the classical generator as Ω2r =
VE′
MX′d
cos(ϕ).
For some , γ(Ωr−) = −γ(Ωr+). We must therefore ensure
that MγTδΓ+(MγTδΓ)
†  0 and −MγTδΓ− (MγTδΓ)† 
0, respectively, when ensuring the generator’s passivity on
either side of the resonant peak. The only way for these state-
ments to be simultaneously true is for MTδΓ+(MTδΓ)
† ≡ 0.
To accomplish this, we consider the numerical structure of Tδ
for two plausible rotor angle values: δ1 = 0 and δ2 = pi4 :
Tδ (δ1) =
[
0 −1
0 0
]
=
1
2
(
T 4 − T 3
)
, (42)
Tδ (δ2) =
[
1
2 − 12
1
2 − 12
]
=
1
4
(
T 2 + T 4
)
. (43)
Since MT 4Γ +
(
MT 4Γ
)† ≡ 0, then we must also require
MT 3Γ+
(
MT 3Γ
)† ≡ 0 from (42) and MT 2Γ+(MT 2Γ)† ≡
0 from (43) in order to ensure that MTδΓ + (MTδΓ)
† ≡ 0.
We are thus requiring that Re
{
v˜†
(
MT iΓ
)
v˜
}
= 0, ∀v˜ ∈
C2×1, ∀i ∈ {2, 3, 4}. As stated in Corollary 3, the only way
to achieve losslessness for basis matrices 2, 3 and 4 is for
Γ = (jβT 4)M
†. By employing this transformation, Lemma 1
proves that the quadratic energy associated with any element
containing T 1 will be rendered indefinite in sign. Since (38b)
contains T 1 when resistance is present in the network, then
there exists no nonsingular matrices M and Γ for which
MYΓ + (MYΓ)†  0, ∀Y ∈ {Yp, Yz, Yg}.
Corollary 4. By choosing M = T 1, β = −1Ω , and Γ =
(jβT 4)M
†, we arrive at the passivity transformation implic-
itly employed by the DEF, as given by [11, eq. (38a,b)].
Corollary 5. The passivity transformation Γ = (jβT 4)M†
renders constant power and reactive (capacitive or inductive)
elements of the system lossless, classical generators passive
(see [11, eq. (49)]), and resistive elements non-passive. With-
out resistive elements, the DEF method is a fully reliable
source-location technique in classical power systems.
Corollary 6. Since the linearized admittance matrix Y asso-
ciated with any ZIP load is purely real, i.e. Y = Re{Y}, the
eigenvalues of its transformed Hermitian part will be equal
and opposite in value: λ(MYΓ + (MYΓ)†) = ±α.
If a network has no resistive elements and is truly passive,
no quadratic energy production can occur on regular network
elements, so injections of energy have to be related to external
sources, like FOs. This is why finding a passive energy-
like form is important, and why the almost-passive form
used by DEF has had so much success. To further show
why the results of Theorem 1 are problematic for the DEF
method, we consider the structure of (24): since the generator
damping contributions are positive definite, the source energy
is necessarily negative in a lossless power system. To contest
this point in a lossy power system, we define block matrices
M ∈ C2n×2n and Γ ∈ C2n×2n, where
M =
 M 0. . .
0 M
 , Γ =
 Γ 0. . .
0 Γ
 ,
and whose block diagonal matrices are given by M and Γ =
(jβT 4)M
†, respectively. We left multiply (17a) by M and
insert ΓΓ−1 on the RHS:
−MJ′ = M (E†aYLEa + Y ′S)ΓΓ−1Vb. (44)
Defining the transformed voltage vectors Ub = Γ−1Vb and
Us = Γ
−1Vs, we left multiply (44) by U
†
b and simplify.
We may group the dissipating power injections into their
respective contributing groups (assuming lossless loads):
0=U†sMI ′︸ ︷︷ ︸
Source
+U†b(MY ′SΓ)Ub︸ ︷︷ ︸
Generator
+U†b(ME
†
aYLEaΓ)Ub︸ ︷︷ ︸
Network
. (45)
The FO source term can produce only negative damping
energy, i.e. Re{U†sMI ′}≤0, if the condition
M
(Y ′S+E†aYLEa)Γ + (M (Y ′S+E†aYLEa)Γ)† 0 (46)
is met. If it is not met, indefinitely signed resistive energy can
dominate damper winding energy absorption and the source
term can, in fact, appear as a positively damped element. In
this plausible situation, the DEF method will fail. Next, we
show that the sign of the injected resistive energy can be
negated if all system voltages are complex conjugated.
Theorem 2. Consider a lossy transmission network model.
For any transformed voltage vector Ub which yields quadratic
energy Re{U†b(M(E†aYLEa)Γ)Ub}=P ?r , there exists conju-
gated vector U∗b which yields an equal and opposite quadratic
energy Re{U∗†b (M(E†aYLEa)Γ)U∗b} = −P ?r , where M and
Γ, with submatrices M and Γ, yield from Corollary 3.
Proof. We split the transmission line matrix into its conductive
and susceptive parts: YL = YG + YBx, where YG,i = GiT 1
and YBx,i = BiT 4. We also define block matrices M = jT 4Γ
and Γ = T 1 from M and Γ. Therefore, M
(
E†aYLEa
)
Γ =
M
(
E†a (YG + YBx)Ea
)
. The Hermitian part (termed H) is
2H = ME†a(YG+YBx)Ea + E†a (YG−YBx)EaM† (47a)
= M
(
E†aYGEa
)
+
(
E†aYGEa
)
M (47b)
= 2M
(
E†aYGEa
)
(47c)
where the matrices of (47b) commute since the product of
Hermitian matrices is also Hermitian. For input Ub, we
consider the quadratic power P ?r = U
†
b(ME
†
aYGEa)Ub. We
define Gij ≡ jGijT 4, where Gij is the scalar line conductance
connecting buses i and j, and ui⊂Ub is the voltage element
of Ub associated with bus i:
P ?r =
n∑
i=1
u†i (
∑
j 6=i
Gij)ui −
n∑
j 6=i
n∑
i 6=j
u†iT 4Gijuj (48a)
=
∑
i,j∈E
(u†iGijui+u
†
jGijuj−u†iGijuj−u†jGijui) (48b)
=
∑
i,j∈E
(ui − uj)†Gij (ui − uj)︸ ︷︷ ︸
uij
. (48c)
6The quadratic quantity x†Gijx =  may be negated by
conjugating the input (proof trivial): x∗†Gijx∗=−. By taking
U∗b as an input to Re{MU∗†b (E†aYGEa)U∗b}, we have
−P ?r =
∑
i,j∈E
u∗†ijGiju
∗
ij . (49)
by (48c). This is true for any input pair Ub, U∗b .
We note that Ub cannot be chosen arbitrarily; it must
represent a valid solution to the linear system of (17a). Since
Ub is not itself a degree of freedom but rather a response
to some current injection, statements about the mathematical
characteristics of MYNΓ + (MYNΓ)† are difficult to prove
using energy based arguments. In the proof of the following
theorem, we assume the transformed voltage vector Ub is
Ub = U
_
s Uns, where ΓUns = −Y−14 Y3ΓUs from (17b).
Theorem 3. Consider a classical power system with ZIP
loads and a lossy transmission network. The Kron reduced
admittance (DWE) seen by a FO source is YN as in (18). The
matrix N1 = 12 (MYNΓ)+ 12 (MYNΓ)†, with matrices M and
Γ from Corollary 3, will have eigenvalues λ1 and λ2.
(a) If condition (46) is met, λ1, λ2 > 0.
(b) If Re{U†sMI ′} > 0 is measured, i.e. the DEF method
has failed, condition (46) is violated and λ1 ∨ λ2 < 0.
Proof. By modifying (45), we have −U†sMI ′=U†bM(Y ′S+
E†aYLEa)ΓUb, and with condition (46) met, −U†sMI ′ >
0. Since −I ′ = YNVs, we have that −U†sMYNΓUs > 0
by substitution, implying that λ{(MYNΓ) + (MYNΓ)†} >
0, ∀λ ∈ {λ1, λ2}, proving proposition (a).
If Re{U†sMI ′} > 0, then U†sN1Us > 0 is directly im-
plied. Accordingly, λ1∨λ2 < 0. By the conservation argument
presented in the proof of proposition (a), if U†sN1Us > 0,
then Re{U†bM(Y ′S+E†aYLEa)ΓUb} < 0 implying the viola-
tion of condition (46), proving proposition (b).
While resistive elements of power systems can drive an
eigenvalue of the system’s transformed Kron admittance N1
negative, it cannot drive both eigenvalues negative. Mathemat-
ically, if det(N1) ≥ 0 then trace(N1) ≥ 0.
IV. A PASSIVITY ENFORCED INFERENCE TECHNIQUE FOR
PERFORMING SOURCE LOCATION
The implicit goal of the DEF method is to locate the
source of negative damping in the system. When resistive
elements are introduced to the network, the goal becomes
obfuscated because the source appears passive, and thus,
positively damped. As a corollary to Theorem 3 though, the
negative3 DWE of the source cannot be physically passive. A
key contribution of this paper recognizes that while generators
continue to be physically passive, the source only appears4
passive when the DEF method fails. The goal of this section
is to determine the generator whose dynamics appear, but are
not physically, passive.
Given complex input (u˜v) and output (y˜) vectors for the
system in (3), the admittance Y ∈ C2×2 cannot be directly
3Since the DWE is the admittance of the network “seen” by the source, the
negative DWE is the admittance seen by the network behind the source bus.
4The transformed FRF will have one positive and one negative eigenvalue.
inferred. In order to construct this matrix, 8 coefficients
(ai, bi, ∀i ∈ {1, 2, 3, 4}) are necessary:[ Y1 Y2
Y3 Y4
]
=
4∑
i=1
(ai + jbi)T i, (50)
but (3) only presents two complex (four real) linear equations.
As posed, the problem is underdetermined and cannot be
solved. We may use an optimization technique to infer the true
admittance, but since there may be infinite solutions, we can
leverage regularization, inequality, and equality constraints:
min
a,b
∥∥∥I˜− YV˜∥∥∥2
2
+ κf(a,b,Ω)
s.t. Ya =
∑
i=1...4
(ai + jbi)T i
0 ≤ g(a,b)
0 = h(a,b).
(51)
In this section, function h will be used to qualitatively con-
strain the basis matrices, g will be used to enforce DEF
passivity, and f will be used as a regularizing prior (with
regularization parameter κ) which gathers data from other
frequency bins outside of the forcing frequency Ωd. After
introducing inference techniques to solve load and generator
problems, this section shows how the solutions may be used in
combination with the perturbative network model to define an
improved source-location technique for when the DEF fails.
A. Load Modeling Assumptions
While modeling loads explicitly is challenging, in the con-
text of FOs, we are interested in load response to small, low
frequency perturbations. Assuming power is an instantaneous
function of voltage magnitude and frequency, we have
P (t) = P0 (V/V0)
αp (ω/ω0)
βp (52a)
Q(t) = Q0 (V/V0)
αq (ω/ω0)
βq , (52b)
where ω = ω0 + θ˙. Since we are interested in the linearized
responses of (52a) and (52b), we evaluate their partial deriva-
tives at equilibrium (V0, ω0) to yield the perturbation matrix.
Assuming sinusoidal perturbations, phasor notation yields[
P˜
Q˜
]
︸ ︷︷ ︸
S˜
=
[
αpP0 βpP0
αqQ0 βqQ0
]
︸ ︷︷ ︸
Ya
[
1 0
0 j
]
︸ ︷︷ ︸
Ij
[
V˜
θ˜
]
︸ ︷︷ ︸
V˜p
(53)
where ω˜ = jθ˜. Since Ya is the sum of four real basis matrices,
(53) can be solved5 exactly via the simple inference problem
min
a
∥∥∥S˜− YaIjV˜p∥∥∥2
2
s.t. Ya =
∑
i=1...4
aiT i.
(54)
We may use Ya to compute the admittance which relates volt-
age and current perturbations. Employing matrix T1 from [10,
eq. (10)], we transform from polar to rectangular in (53):
S˜ = YaIj
(
T−11 T1
)
V˜p (55a)
= YaIjT−11 V˜. (55b)
5Load inference may not be possible when stochastic load variation or
measurement noise overpowers the load’s dynamic response to the FO.
7We consider perturbations of P = VrIr+IiVi and Q = ViIr−
VrIi. Treating V¯i/r and I¯i/r as steady state values, we have[
P˜
Q˜
]
=
[
I¯r I¯i
−I¯i I¯r
]
︸ ︷︷ ︸
AI
[
V˜r
V˜i
]
︸ ︷︷ ︸
V˜
+
[
V¯r V¯i
V¯i −V¯r
]
︸ ︷︷ ︸
AV
[
I˜r
I˜i
]
︸ ︷︷ ︸
I˜
. (56)
By equating (55b) and (56), I˜ and V˜ are directly related by
I˜ = A−1V
(YaIjT−11 −AI) V˜. (57)
B. Generator Modeling Assumptions
Generators are highly complex network elements with mul-
tiple control loops and nonlinearities. In response to small,
low frequency oscillations, however, the fast electromagnetic
transients and the slow droop control effects may often be
neglected. We are primarily concerned with a machine’s
electromechanical response along with any AVR influence.
The corresponding generator inference problem which we
seek to solve may be biased by any sort of prior model,
such as in [14], but eliminating an explicit dependence on
an analytically constructed prior model is advantageous for a
variety of reasons. There are structural priors which may still
be incorporated, though. The FRF of the classical generator,
for example, contains no complex variation of basis matrix T 1,
as stated explicitly by (38c). When this model is upgraded to
the third order synchronous generator model with first order
AVR effects, standard parameter values from [15] may be
applied to build its FRF Yg via (50). We find6 that∥∥(α1 + jβ1)T 1∥∥ / ‖Yg‖ ∼ 1%. (58)
Therefore, the effects from basis matrix T 1 may be safely
neglected for a third order machine with an AVR. As a
secondary structural constraint, we leverage an important
assumption of the DEF method: in response to low frequency
oscillations, generators are incrementally passive devices [16].
In the inference problem, we therefore enforce passivity.
We also define the set Ω = {Ωd− , . . . ,Ωd, . . . ,Ωd+ },
where Ωd is the forcing frequnecy of interest, and  is the
narrow bandwidth around Ωd where we believe Yg will have
sufficiently little variation (such as  = 0.05 Hz). Assuming
the system loads are driven by filtered white noise (such as
Ornstein Uhlenbeck), the voltage V˜(Ω) and current I˜(Ω) data
outside of the forcing frequnecy should present sufficiently
rich data for regularizing our generator inference problem:
min
a, b
∥∥∥I˜(Ωd)−YgV˜(Ωd)∥∥∥2
2
+ κ
∑
Ω∈Ω\Ωd
∥∥∥I˜(Ω)−YgV˜(Ω)∥∥∥2
2
s.t. Yg =
∑
i=2...4
(ai + jbi)T i (59)
0 ≤ λ((MYgΓ)+(MYgΓ)†), ∀λ ∈ {λ1, λ2}.
While this regularizer is useful for inferring generator admit-
tances, it may not be effective with loads given their stochastic
fluctuations. We note that (59) can be solved at a FO source
bus and still yield a passive FRF estimate.
6The results of (58), along with the passivity assumption of (59), are found
to be valid when the effects of the AVR are minor, i.e., when the frequency
of the FO is large enough to elicit a small response from the AVR. For very
low frequnecy oscillations, passivity is likely to be lost.
C. Comparing Kron Predictions with Inference Results
After solving the generator and load inference problems of
the previous two subsections, the perturbative system model
in (14) will be explicitly characterized. The location of the
FO source, though, will still be unknown since (59) will
have been solved at all generator buses: source and non-
source. To test which solution to (59) does not correspond
to a physically meaningful FRF, the key idea to leverage is
this: we assume the inference results are sufficiently correct
(physically meaningful) at ng − 1 of the generators, so a
physically meaningful DWE can be constructed only at the
source. The source DWE will be capable of predicting its own
current injection. For robust implementation, we construct a
network model similar to (17b) but with two source currents: −I ′i−I ′j
0
 =
 Y1 Y2 Y3Y4 Y5 Y6
Y7 Y8 Y9
 ViVj
Vn
 , (60)
where −I ′i, −I ′j are the measured7 current injections at
generators i, j (meaning their dynamics are not included in the
admittance matrix), the admittance matrix is constructed using
inference results, and Vn is the voltage perturbation vector in
the remaining network. Since Vn = −Y−19 (Y7Vi + Y8Vj),
we may Kron reduce the remaining system:
−I ′i =
(
m1 −m2m−14 m3
)
Vi −m2m−14 I ′j (61)
where m1 = Y1 − Y3Y−19 Y7, m2 = Y2 − Y3Y−19 Y8, m3 =
Y4 −Y6Y−19 Y7, and Y5 −Y6Y−19 Y8. Thus, we may compare
the current prediction of (61) to the actual measured current at
this generator. Of particular note is that this current prediction
does not depend on the inferred dynamics of generator j,
only its current measurement. Since there is one inference
result which is not to be trusted, we may sequentially predict
the currents of all generators i ∈ {1...ng} while sequentially
removing the dynamics of the other j ∈ {1...ng}\i generators.
When the source generator is removed, prediction error should
decrease. Source generator i may be thus identified via
argmin
i
∑
j
∥∥∥I˜i−(m1−m2m−14 m3)Vi+m2m−14 I ′j∥∥∥2
2
. (62)
V. TEST RESULTS
For the sake of illustrative expediency, we present a single
illustrative test case to portray the validity of the presented
framework. Fig. 2 shows a diagram of the IEEE 39-bus
New England system. Generators are third order synchronous
machines [15] with first order AVRs8, while the loads are
modeled by (52a)-(52b) with Onstein Uhlenbeck noise [14].
For simplicity, measurement noise is not considered, the
transmission network model is assumed known, and PMU
network observably is full. System excitation and simulation
is performed in the frequency domain, and all simulation code
is posted online9. After computing system response to a 2Hz
7Since networks aren’t typically fully PMU observable and are often
connected to other unobservable networks, vector −I′j can also be filled
with current injections on the edge of observability, as necessary.
8The gains and time constants of these AVRs were chosen to approximate
the full regulator + exciter system model from [15].
9https://github.com/SamChevalier/Passivity-Enforcement-FOs
8Fig. 2. Dissipating power flow in the lossy IEEE 39-bus power system.
Circles represent generators while rounded rectangles represents loads. Line
thickness and arrow size represent dissipating power flow magnitude.
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Fig. 3. Parsed current prediction errors from (62) for all system generators.
sinusoidal FO applied at bus 31’s generator, the dissipating
power P ? flowing in the network was plotted in Fig. 2. Based
on arrow directionality, all generators are shown to be power
sinks: there is no apparent source in the system. The reason is
due to the active nature of the lines and loads. For example,
in the flow from bus 11 to bus 6, the sending end P ? is larger
than the receiving end P ? (based on arrow sizes), and given the
flow direction, the line is clearly a source of dissipating power.
Similarly, on line 21-22, both arrows point away from the line,
indicating positive dissipating power flows out of both ends of
the line. Since condition (46) is not met in this network, the
FO source is able to act as a dissipating power sink. Therefore,
the source cannot be readily identified by a system operator.
We applied the methods presented in Subsection IV-C. The
inferred generator admittances had a low degree of error
(≤1%), while the inferred loads had a higher degree of error
(1% to 100+%) due to their stochastic fluctuations. Despite
this inference error, the results of (62) were found to be
quite clear, as depicted in Fig. 3. The plot shows the current
prediction error at each generator i as each other generator j
was sequentially removed, and it tells two interesting stories.
1) Blue box “a” shows that prediction error at each generator
drops significantly when source bus 31 is removed.
2) Orange box “b” shows that prediction error at the source
is low regardless of which generator is removed.
Fig. 4 re-constructs the generators’ damping power flows in
the equivalent lossless (lines and loads) network.
Fig. 4. Dissipating power flow in the lossless IEEE 39-bus power system.
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